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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the link between inward FDI and innovation activity in China, using 
a very comprehensive and recent firm level database.  We pay particular attention to the 
impact of domestic access to finance.  Our results show that firms with foreign capital 
participation or those with good access to domestic bank loans innovate more than others 
do.  We also find that inward FDI at the sectoral level is positively associated with 
domestic innovative activity only if firms engage in own R&D or if they have good access 
to domestic finance.  However, access to finance only plays a role for private or collectively 
owned firms, less so for state-owned enterprises.  Furthermore, we distinguish the effect of 
sector level inward FDI into technology transfer and FDI affecting domestic credit 
opportunities and find that the latter is of very little significance for SOEs and is also 
independent of their access to finance.  By contrast, it is an important channel through 
which FDI affects the innovation of domestic private and collectively owned enterprises.   
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I.  Introduction 
Since undergoing economic reforms starting in 1979, China has now emerged as a rapidly 
growing manufacturing base and exporting nation.  This stirred much recent debate in the 
popular press as well as among academics.  For the further development of the Chinese 
economy, technological progress is crucial.  In this regard two features of the economy are 
particularly notable:  Firstly, China has become an important location for R&D and 
innovative activity by domestic enterprises at least since the mid-1990s (e.g., Jefferson et 
al., 2003).  Secondly, China has become an important host country for inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI); indeed, according to OECD (2004), China overtook the US as the largest 
recipient of FDI in the world in 2003.1 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a detailed analysis of whether there is a link 
between the increased levels of inward FDI and innovation activity by Chinese domestic 
enterprises, using a particularly rich and recent firm level dataset for the period 1999 to 
2005.  In this regard we pay particular attention to the importance of domestic access to 
finance.  We believe that China is an interesting case to study because of the juxtaposition 
of a very impressive record in attracting FDI with a highly inefficient and state-dominated 
domestic financial system.  As is well documented, the Chinese financial system if widely 
regarded as inefficient and skewed towards providing financial resources for (largely 
inefficient) state-owned enterprises (e.g., Huang, 2003).  It is therefore of paramount policy 
interest to investigate whether this is related to domestic firms’ ability to benefit (or 
otherwise) from the increased influx of foreign direct investment into the economy.  
Why would one expect the increased influx of FDI to have had any effect on product 
innovation carried out by domestic enterprises?  Firstly, a domestic firm receiving an 
injection of foreign capital can be expected to face lower financial constraints which may 
hinder innovation (Harrison and McMillan, 2003).  Also, it may bring with it an inflow of 
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technology.  After all, multinational enterprises (MNEs) are assumed to have a superior 
technology compared to domestic firms (Markusen, 2002) and, hence, a foreign capital 
inflow through an acquisition, joint venture or some other form of capital transfer may lead 
to the installation of the foreign technology in the domestic firm.  Both of these processes 
could manifest themselves in increasing innovative activity.   
At the level of the industry, inward FDI may also affect innovation through impacting 
credit opportunities or technology transfer.  As to the former, increased inflows of FDI can 
change credit opportunities for domestic firms as shown by Harrison and McMillan (2003) 
and Harrison et al. (2004) and, therefore, affect their innovation activity.  In terms of 
technology transfer, the superior knowledge brought into the economy through FDI may 
leak to domestic firms through, e.g., worker movements, imitation etc, similar to the 
arguments made in the literature on productivity spillovers (e.g., Görg and Greenaway, 
2004).  These firms may then be able to engage in more innovation activity. 
To investigate these issues empirically we use a rich panel data set of some 240,000 
domestic enterprises in Chinese manufacturing industries for the period 1999 to 2005.  Our 
paper contributes to the literature on innovation and technology adoption in developing and 
transition countries.  While this literature, which is reviewed by Keller (2004) and Pack 
(2006), has amassed a large body of evidence for a number of countries, econometric work 
focussing particularly on China is still limited, although the policy and academic interest in 
the Chinese economy has grown immensely.  In that regard, the most closely related paper 
is Jefferson et al. (2006).2  They model, inter alia, a knowledge production function to 
estimate the determinants of innovation activity in Chinese enterprises, using firm level 
data for roughly 20,000 enterprises for 1997 to 1999.  They find that firm size and own 
R&D expenditure are important factors for firms’ innovation.   
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We expand on their analysis in a number of ways:  Firstly, we investigate the impact 
of inward FDI at the firm and industry level on innovation activity, and the role of firm 
characteristics in that regard.  This is an issue not covered by Jefferson et al. (2006) but 
which is of significant policy interest.  Secondly, we pay particular attention to the role of 
access to finance for innovation, and in the link between access to finance and a firms’ 
ability to benefit from positive spillovers from inward foreign direct investment.  This has, 
to the best of our knowledge, not been investigated in the literature thus far.  Thirdly, while 
Jefferson et al. (2006) include dummy variables for different types of ownership we 
investigate in particular whether the determinants of innovation activity, and most 
interestingly the effect of inward FDI, differs for different types of firms according to 
whether they are privately owned, state-owned or collectively owned.  Fourthly, our dataset 
has greater coverage of firms and is for a more recent time period.   
Our results show that, not unexpectedly, firms with foreign capital participation and 
good access to finance innovate more than others.  We also find that inward FDI at the 
sectoral level is positively associated with domestic innovative activity only if firms engage 
in own R&D activities (i.e., have some “absorptive capacity”) or if they have good access 
to domestic finance.  The latter points to a possible adverse effect of domestic credit 
constraints on firms’ ability to benefit from inward FDI.  However, exploiting a feature of 
our dataset and distinguishing firms into state-owned, private, and collectively owned 
enterprises shows that access to finance only plays a role for the latter two.  As is well-
documented SOEs are largely inefficient, but enjoy preferential access to domestic financial 
resources, hence, access to finance provides no bottleneck to them.  Furthermore, we 
distinguish the effect of sector level inward FDI into technology transfer and FDI affecting 
domestic credit opportunities.  Here we find that the latter is of very little significance for 
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SOEs and is also independent of their access to finance.  By contrast, it is an important 
channel through which FDI affects domestic private and collectively owned enterprises.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section II describes the 
empirical approach, while Section III introduces the data set and provides some summary 
statistics.  Econometric results are discussed in Section IV and Section V concludes.   
 
II. Empirical approach 
In our empirical model a domestic firm (indexed by i) either innovates at time t with 
positive rate of innovation ( itS > 0) or it does not ( itS = 0).  To determine the relationship 
between FDI and the rate of product innovation we formulate a Tobit model in terms of a 
latent variable model as follows:3 
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   (1) 
where the dependent variable S is defined as the share of innovation output (that is 
products involving the use of new process innovation and novel technology) in total output.  
This variable, hence, measures the output of the innovation process and is therefore a more 
suitable measure than, e.g., R&D which is an input into the innovation process (see also 
Criscuolo et al., 2005).  On the right-hand-side, the D variables in equation (1) are full sets 
of regional (r), industry (j) and time (t) dummies.  
X is a vector of firm level determinants of innovation which includes R&D intensity, 
the ratio of employee training expenditure to total wage bills, export intensity, subsidies, 
age and the firm’s market share within the three-digit industry.  The choice of these firm 
level covariates is guided by theoretical considerations as well as existing empirical 
evidence.  R&D is an important input into the innovation process and is, hence, included in 
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the model.  A similar argument can be made for human capital, which is an important 
determinant of innovation.  One proxy for human capital available to us is the amount of 
training provided by a firm and we include this in the empirical analysis.  Criscuolo et al. 
(2005) argue and provide evidence that firms that are active on export markets are more 
innovative and we allow for this by controlling for firms’ export intensities.  Furthermore, 
subsidies can help firms to engage more in innovation (e.g., Görg and Strobl, 2007) and we, 
therefore, include a measure of the level of production related grants in our model.  As 
Jefferson et al. (2004) argue, the age of a firm may also be important in explaining 
innovation activity as it is a proxy for a firms’ experience, and, hence, the possibility for 
learning effects.  We therefore follow their approach and include firm age in the equation.  
Finally, Aghion et al. (2005) discuss at lengths the role of competition for innovation, and 
Aitken and Harrison (1999) demonstrate that multinationals may affect the competitive 
landscape in the domestic economy, leading to an increase in competition for domestic 
firms.  To take account of this we include a firm’s market share as an indicator of the 
competitive position of a firm in our model.   
FIN is a measure of firms’ access to finance in terms of their ability to obtain loans 
from domestic banks.  As is well known (e.g., Hall, 2002) financial constraints are a serious 
impediment to innovation activity.  This may be even more so in China which has a very 
regulated and inefficient financial sector and lending is skewed towards providing loans to 
inefficient state-owned enterprises (e.g., Huang, 2003).   
To capture the central issue of this paper, namely, the impact of foreign direct 
investment on innovative activity in Chinese domestic firms, FC is a measure of foreign 
capital participation in firm i to allow for the fact that firms with some share of foreign 
capital may be more innovative active for the reasons discussed above.  FDI is a vector of 
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industry-region specific FDI indices to capture the potential spillover or crowding out 
effects of the extent of foreign direct investment at the industry level.   
We allow the effect of FDI to vary according to a firm’s R&D activity and access to 
finance by including two interaction terms in the empirical estimation of equation (1), 
interacting FDI with R&D intensity and FDI with FIN, respectively.  The former captures 
the notion that firms with higher absorptive capacity are better able to benefit from the 
technology transferred by incoming FDI.4  The second interaction term allows firms with 
better access to finance to benefit more from inward FDI be they are less financially 
constrained and therefore may be better able to implement the new technology, and may be 
less affected by reductions in the availability of domestic finance due to demand for loans 
by foreign firms.   
All covariates in the empirical model are lagged by one period in order to mitigate 
potential endogeneity concerns.  Still, there are some firm level variables in the above 
specification that are arguably potentially endogenous.  One prominent example is R&D 
intensity as it is a major input into the product innovation process, and the choice of this 
input is likely to be correlated with factors that determine the firm’s decision to innovate.  
Similar arguments can also be made regarding the potential endogeneity of the other firm 
level variables.  In order to deal with this potential problem, we also treat all lagged firm 
level variables except age as potentially endogenous in order to check the robustness of our 
results.  To do so we use an instrumental variables technique for Tobit models due to 
Blundell and Smith (1986).5   
Twice lagged values of the potentially endogenous variables are used as instruments.  
Our assumption is that conditional on the regressors, these variables are asymptotically  
uncorrelated with the error term of the model. Ultimately, however, this is an empirical 
issue, and we test our assumption using the Sargan/Hansen test for the validity of 
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instrumental variables. We also employ additional instruments, viz.,  (i) share of state-
owned enterprises in region/industry; (ii) share of loss making state-owned enterprises in 
region/industry, (iii) level of regional financial development (share of bank loans to the 
private sector) and (iv) whether the firm is politically affiliated with local, regional or 
central governments.  These instruments are designed to account for the endogeneity of 
sector level FDI and access to finance.  For example, the share of the state sector is a proxy 
for state dominance in the sector/region, and to the extent that state-dominated 
sectors/regions have different access to finance this is a reasonable instrument for firm level 
access to finance.  Similar arguments can be made for the share of loss making SOEs and 
the level of regional financial development.  Furthermore, a large number of enterprises in 
China are affiliated to some level of government administration.  The function of the 
relevant government body is to offer credit guarantees and political protection to the 
affiliated private firms.  This political affiliation variable is strongly related to firms’ access 
to finance since China’s financial system is still dominated by the four big state banks. By 
using different levels of political affiliation as instruments, we make the realistic 
assumption that the effect of political affiliation on innovation comes mainly through its 
effects on finance.  Again, however, ultimately the relevance of the instruments is an 
empirical issue which we test for in the estimation below. 
 
III. Database description and variable construction 
Our econometric analysis draws on confidential data from the Annual Report of Industrial 
Enterprise Statistics compiled by the State Statistical Bureau of China (SSB).  The report 
covers the population of state-owned enterprises and all non-state firms with annual 
turnover of over five million Renminbi (just above $600,000).  It is estimated that the firms 
contained in the data set account for about 85-90% of total output in most industries.  The 
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SSB performs several logical tests to ensure the accuracy of the information in the report 
and identify illogical data. 
The data set includes information on firm ownership structure, industry affiliation, 
geographic location, establishment year, employment, gross output, product innovation, 
R&D, value added, net fixed assets, exports, and employee training expenditures.6  The 
data set available to us spans the period 1999 to 2005, and comprises more than 1.3 million 
observations from about 446,000 firms. It is worth noting that we used the whole sample to 
construct various variables of interest (e.g. share of foreign firms in an industry-region or 
the firms’ market share). However, the econometric work is confined to domestic-owned 
enterprises, in view of the objective of this paper.   
The SSB assigns to each firm in the database a categorical variable indicating its 
ownership status.  Nevertheless, it is also possible to construct a continuous measure of 
ownership composition from the database by looking at the fraction of paid-in capital 
contributed by the state, private domestic and foreign investors.  Using this measure of 
ownership, we define a firm as being state-owned, collectively or private if the state, 
collectives or private individuals are the majority investors in the firm, respectively.  In the 
final analysis 239,085 domestic firms (with 630,900 total observations) have the necessary 
information for the econometric estimation.  
The data set provides information on the extent of foreign capital participation at the 
level of the firm.  This enables us to calculate the share of foreign ownership in the 
domestic enterprise and identify the direct effects of FDI on domestic firms’ innovative 
activity.  On the other hand, in order to estimate the indirect (spillover) effect of FDI at the 
level of the industry we calculate, for each of the 171 three-digit industries and 31 
provinces, the proportion of output accounted for by companies with foreign ownership in 
the industry and region.7  This measure of industry-region FDI is also alternatively defined 
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as the proportion of new products accounted for by multinational companies (FDI 
innovation) as well as the share of domestic bank loans taken by foreign multinationals 
(FDI loan) in order to try and distinguish the effect of sectoral level inward investment on 
innovation through technology transfer or affecting credit opportunities.   
Table 1 gives the definition of the variables used in the analysis along with some 
summary statistics.  A number of points are noteworthy.  Firstly, there are no substantial 
differences in either innovation activity or the level of R&D or training between state-
owned enterprises, private or collectively owned firms apparent in these summary statistics.  
However, as expected we do find that state-owned enterprises receive on average higher 
shares of bank loans as well as larger subsidies from government.  On the other hand, they 
are less export intensive and receive lower inflows of foreign capital.   
[Table 1 here] 
In Table 2, we report the pattern of product innovation development between 1999 
and 2005 for SOEs across the two-digit industries.  There are a number of noteworthy 
points.  Firstly, the proportion of innovating firms has risen over time in most sectors.  
However, the share of new product sales in total sales, while generally quite significant, has 
slightly declined in most sectors.  Secondly, labour intensive sectors (e.g., food 
manufacturing and paper products) have in general the lowest proportion of innovators.  
However, export-competing labour intensive sectors (e.g., textile industry) exhibit a 
relatively large number of innovators.  Finally, the product innovation intensity is 
remarkably similar across labour intensive (e.g. plastic products), capital-intensive 
(transport equipment) and technology intensive (e.g. medical and pharmaceutical products) 
sectors. 
[Table 2 here] 
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IV. Discussion of the results 
Table 3, column (1) presents the benchmark Tobit model which controls for firm 
heterogeneity through allowing for firm random effects.  Furthermore, the model includes 
two additional dummy variables for private and collectively owned firms.   
The estimation shows that R&D intensity exerts a positive and significant influence 
on the rate of product innovation.  This is as expected given that R&D intensity is a major 
input in the product innovation process.  We also find that firms that invest in employee 
training have higher innovation intensity.  This suggests that there may be complementarity 
between human capital investment and innovation as discussed by, for example, Redding 
(1996).  Also, we find a positive relationship between production innovation and exporting, 
and that firms that enjoy higher market shares in their industry are more likely to engage in 
product innovation activity.  Furthermore, firms’ receipt of subsidies is positively related to 
innovation.  Again, these findings are in line with the international literature discussed 
above.  As concerns firm age, our results suggest that older firms are more likely to engage 
in product innovation than their younger counterparts.  This points to the importance of 
experience in the innovation process.8   
More closely related to the central issue of our paper, we find evidence that firms 
with some foreign capital participation are more likely to engage in product innovation.  As 
discussed above, this may be either due to the influx of new technology, or the reduction in 
financial constraints associated with the capital injection.9  Unfortunately, with the data at 
hand we cannot distinguish between these two rival hypotheses.  Furthermore, we find that 
access to finance is positively associated with innovation.  The magnitude of the effect of 
firm level foreign capital is economically significant.  For example, a doubling of the 
foreign share is associated with a 13.5 percentage point change in the share of new products 
in total output, all else constant.  The economic significance of access to domestic finance 
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is equally noteworthy.  A standard deviation (2.519) increase in this variable leads to a 10 
percentage point increase in innovation intensity. 
Turning our attention to the indirect effects of FDI at the sector/region level, it is 
evident that firms only benefit from inward FDI if they are R&D active or if they have 
good access to domestic finance in the form of bank loans.  Taking the point estimates at 
face value, firms with R&D intensities of at least 0.45 (and zero domestic bank loans), or 
firms with a ratio of bank loans to assets of at least 4.2 (and zero R&D) are able to benefit 
from FDI.  These two threshold values are well beyond the mean values in our sample as 
reported in Table 1.   
The results in column (1) treat all variables as exogenous.  This may not be a too 
heroic assumption, given that (i) all covariates are lagged one period, (ii) we include 
dummies for private and collectively owned firms, and (iii) we allow for unobserved firm 
level heterogeneity by including firm random effects.  However, there may still be a 
lingering concern with endogeneity and to deal with this more formally we estimate the 
model also using the endogenous Tobit model as discussed in Section 2 (see column 2).  Of 
course, the reliability of the endogenous Tobit hinges on the validity of instruments used.  
To our knowledge there are no formal tests of the validity of instruments within the context 
of these endogenous Tobit specifications.  Nevertheless, in order to gauge the 
appropriateness of the instruments we also estimate a linear instrumental variables model 
(using the same set of instruments as for the endogenous Tobit) and obtain a Sargan test 
statistic of the implied overidentifying restrictions.  The test result, which is reported in 
column (3), suggests the validity of the instrumental variables.  Reassuringly, the results of 
the estimations in both columns (2) and (3) are very much in line with our baseline equation 
in column (1), both in terms of statistical significance and magnitude of the coefficients.  In 
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what follows, we therefore focus our attention on estimations using the Tobit estimator 
allowing for firm random effects, as in column (1).   
[Table 3] 
While the estimations thus far allow for firm level heterogeneity, it constrains the 
coefficients of the independent variables to be the same for all types of firms.  This may be 
an unrealistic assumption given the large differences in performance between state-owned 
enterprises and other types of firms in China.  We therefore exploit the ownership 
dimension of our dataset more and break the sample into (i) state-owned, (ii) private and 
(iii) collectively owned enterprises, as defined in section 3 and estimate equation (1) 
separately on the different samples.  This is reported in Table 4, columns (1) to (3).  As can 
be seen, there are some striking differences in the effects of the covariates on innovation 
across the three ownership types.  We focus our discussion on the effects of foreign capital, 
finance and sector level FDI as this is the central theme of this paper.  
Firstly, we find that the relationship between access to finance and innovation is 
most pronounced amongst private and collectively owned firms that are known to suffer 
from discrimination by the country’s financial system compared to SOEs.  Secondly, the 
coefficient on foreign capital is largest for SOEs, suggesting that injections of foreign 
capital are associated with the highest positive impact on innovation for these types of 
firms.  This may reflect the inefficiencies in these firms, which imply that foreign capital, 
which as a result may reduce inefficiencies, has the highest benefits for them.10  Perhaps the 
most striking result, however, is that the interaction term of FDI and access to finance is 
positive, as before, for private and collectively owned firms, but statistically insignificant 
for SOEs.  Hence, access to finance plays no role in generating spillovers to state-owned 
enterprises.  As is well-documented these enterprises are largely inefficient, but enjoy 
preferential access to domestic financial resources.   
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Taking a different slice of the data we distinguish loss making from profit making 
firms in our data (columns 4 and 5).  The former group is, of course, mostly associated with 
state-owned enterprises in China.  Results are in line with expectations: there is no role for 
access to finance for innovation in loss making enterprises, and access to finance also does 
not matter in terms of benefiting from indirect effects from sector level inward FDI.11 
[Table 4] 
We discussed above that the two main ways in which sector level FDI can affect 
domestic innovation is through technology transfer or through affecting credit opportunities 
for domestic firms.  In the next step in our analysis we try to distinguish these two channels 
by calculating two different FDI measures:  (i) aggregate innovation by foreign 
multinationals calculated as innovation output by foreign multinationals in a sector-region 
over total innovation output, and (ii) aggregate borrowing by foreign multinationals as the 
share of domestic bank loans in total bank loans in the sector-region.  The results of this 
exercise are reported in Table 5.   
A glance at the results in columns (1) to (3) shows that the effects of the two 
variables are broadly similar to private and collectively owned firms.  FDI, either through 
technology transfer or affecting credit opportunities, only has a positive effect depending on 
firms’ R&D activity and financial situation in terms of access to bank loans.  This is 
different for state-owned enterprises, however.  While there is a positive effect of 
technology transfer by multinationals for SOEs that do invest in their own R&D the firms’ 
financial position does not play any role in mitigating the effect of FDI technology.  
Furthermore, there is no direct statistically significant relationship between FDI affecting 
credit opportunities and SOEs’ ability to innovate, and the impact of this channel of FDI 
does not depend on the SOEs’ ability to access domestic bank loans.  This again suggests 
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that SOEs’ preferential access to domestic financial resources implies that financial aspects 
do not represent any constraints for them.  
In alternative estimations in columns (4) and (5) we distinguish our data again into 
loss making and profit making enterprises.  Results for loss makers closely resemble those 
for SOEs, showing that access to finance is relatively unimportant for these types of firms, 
as far as innovation is concerned.12 
[Table 5] 
 
V. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the link between inward FDI and innovation activity in China, using 
a large and recent firm level database.  We pay particular attention to the impact of 
domestic access to finance in this regard, as the financial system in China has been widely 
described as inefficient and skewed towards SOEs.  Hence, it is of immense policy interest 
to see how this may effect domestic firms’ ability to benefit (or otherwise) from inward 
FDI.   
Our econometric analysis shows that access to finance is an important issue for 
firms’ innovation activity, and their ability to benefit from inward FDI.  This, however, is 
mainly the case for private and collectively owned firms, less so for state-owned firms 
which are the beneficiaries from the current financial system.   
In particular we find that firms with foreign capital participation, or those with good 
access to domestic bank loans innovate more than others – these are the firms with low 
financial constraints.  We also find that inward FDI at the sectoral level is positively 
associated with domestic innovative activity only if firms engage in own R&D activities 
(i.e., have some “absorptive capacity”) or if they have good access to domestic finance.  
The latter points to a possible adverse effect of domestic credit constraints on firms’ ability 
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to benefit from inward FDI.  However, exploiting a feature of our dataset and 
distinguishing firms into state-owned, private, and collectively owned enterprises shows 
that access to finance only plays a role for the latter two.  As is well-documented SOEs are 
largely inefficient, but enjoy preferential access to domestic financial resources, hence, 
access to finance provides no bottleneck to them.  Furthermore, we distinguish the effect of 
sector level inward FDI into technology transfer and FDI affecting domestic credit 
opportunities.  Here we find that the latter is of very little significance for SOEs and is also 
independent of their access to finance.  By contrast, it is an important channel through 
which FDI affects the innovation of domestic private and collectively owned enterprises.   
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Amiti and Javorcik (2007), Wei (2003) and Lemoine (2000) for analyses of the increased 
inflow of FDI and determinants thereof.   
2 There are, of course, a number of other more loosely related papers that should be noted.  Hu et al. (2005) 
estimate the determinants of firm level productivity using a similar dataset to Jefferson et al. (2006).  They 
focus on the role of own firm R&D as well as technology purchased from foreign or domestic sources on firm 
level productivity.  As to the evidence on productivity spillovers and technology diffusion from FDI, Girma 
and Gong (2007) use a dataset on Chinese state-owned enterprises to investigate the link between inward FDI 
spillovers and productivity of Chinese state-owned enterprises, while Berthelemy and Demurger (2000) use 
regional level data to investigate the role of inward FDI for regional growth in China.   
3 Definitions of all the variables, plus summary statistics, are provided in Table 1 which is discussed in the 
next section.   
4 See Girma (2005) for a discussion of the importance of absorptive capacity, and an empirical illustration 
using firm level data for the United Kingdom.   
5 The estimation of Tobit models with endogenous regressors essentially involves two steps: (i) generate 
residual terms from linear regressions of each endogenous variable on the instrumental variables and all other 
exogenous regressors, and (ii) estimate a standard Tobit model by including the residual terms from step (i) in 
the list of covariates. The standard errors are bootstrapped to take into account for the fact that residual terms 
are generated regressors. The residual terms are correction terms for the endogeneity problem, and jointly 
statistically significant coefficients can be taken as evidence in favour of the hypothesis that instrumented 
variables are indeed endogenous.  A one-step variant of this estimator involving stronger distributional 
assumptions is also available (Newey, 1987).  However, this fails to attain convergence in our data.  This type 
of convergence problem is frequently encountered when there are more than one endogenous regressors.   
6 Nominal values are deflated using industry-specific ex-factory price indices obtained from the China 
Statistical Yearbook 2006. 
7 Officially, foreign-owned multinationals are defined in the data as enterprises with at least 25% share of 
foreign capital.  There are also domestically-owned enterprises which have foreign capital participation of less 
than 25 percent which are not considered in this definition.  We exploit the richness of our data set and weigh 
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the output of firms with foreign capital by the extent of their foreign participation, measured by the share of 
foreign capital at the level of the firm.  Under this definition of sectoral FDI, firms that are classified as 
domestic but have some foreign capital will also (proportionally) contribute to aggregate output of the foreign 
sector.  Note that the recent literature on productivity spillovers from FDI has pointed out that domestic firms 
can benefit not only from horizontal (as calculated here) but also vertical spillovers through customer-supplier 
linkages (e.g., Javorcik, 2004).  In an earlier draft of the paper we also calculated such vertical measures 
(backward and forward spillovers) but found them to be consistently statistically insignificant.  Hence, we do 
not include them in the analysis that follows.   
8 Note that Jefferson et al. (2004) find no statistically significant relationship between age and innovation in 
their analysis of a smaller sample of Chinese firms.  Note that our sample is much larger, and our estimation 
controls for a much larger number of covariates than they did.   
9 Another reason why foreign-owned firms may in general be more innovation active is that they employ 
more skilled workers.  In our estimation we control for the quality of the workforce using a variable on labour 
training, hence we control at least partly for this possibility.   
10 This is in line with recent work by Bartel and Harrison (2005) which show that state-owned enterprises in 
Indonesia benefit hugely from foreign ownership in the enterprise.   
11 As a robustness check, we also re-estimated Table 4 using the endogenous Tobit estimator.  Results are 
very similar and are, hence, not reported to save space.   
12 We carried out one further robustness check where we included squared terms of foreign capital, FDI 
innovation and FDI loans in the estimations.  Results, which are not reported here to save space, are robust to 
this slight modification of the estimating equation.   
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Table 1 
Variables definition and summary statistics 
 
Variable Definition         SOE 
 
PRIVATE 
 
COLLECTIVE 
 
  Mean      Std. dev Mean      Std. dev Mean      Std. dev 
Product innovation Share of output involving new  process or 
product innovation  0.041 0.150 0.034 0.151 0.021 0.116 
 Restricted  sample of firms with non-zero 
product innovation 0.319 0.295 0.390 0.350 0.369 0.331 
R&D  R&D expenditure divided by sales  0.002 0.021 0.002 0.013 0.001 0.007 
 Restricted  sample of firms with non-zero 
R&D expenditure 0.013 0.046 0.012 0.337 0.008 0.018 
Labour training Employee training expenditure per 
employee 0.007 0.027 0.008 0.035 0.008 0.037 
 Restricted  sample of firms with non-zero 
labour training outlay 0.015 0.037 0.021 0.053 0.037 0.053 
Export intensity Share of  exports in total sales  0.043 0.164 0.127 0.298 0.110 0.281 
 Restricted sample of exporters 0.307 0.328 0.580 0.380 0.594 0.374 
Market shares Firm’s share of sales in total three-digit 
industry region sales  0.044 0.134 0.022 0.082 0.021 0.073 
Domestic finance Domestic bank loans normalised by total 
asset. 1.806 2.519 0.825 1.874 0.876 1.886 
Subsidy Log of production subsidy from local and 
central governments 0.983 2.335 0.642 1.843 0.796 2.052 
Age  Log year   since establishment 3.147 0.914 1.848 0.935 2.569 0.806 
 Foreign capital  Share of  foreign multinationals capital in 
firm’s total capital 0.002 0.033 0.004 0.050 0.006 0.060 
   FDI  The share of foreign multinationals’  sales  
in three digit industry-region total sales 0.143 0.181 0.194 0.191 0.175 0.182 
 FDI innovation The share of multinationals’ innovative 
output in  digit industry-region total  
innovation 0.097 0.196 0.140 0.212 0.127 0.206 
FDI loan The share of multinationals' domestic 
bank loans over total domestic bank loans 0.099 0.161 0.168 0.198 0.148 0.184 
Number of firms 239085 (total) 34549 148694 55842 
Total observations 630900 (total) 125357 316461 189082 
 
 22
 
Table 2: 
           Sectoral and temporal pattern of product innovation for SOEs 
 
 Fraction of innovators 
New product sales/total 
sales 
Two-digit industry classification 1999 2005 1999 2005 
13-Food Processing 0.020 0.101 0.323 0.166
14-Food Production 0.043 0.116 0.292 0.239
15-Beverage Industry 0.060 0.120 0.272 0.251
16-Tobacco Processing 0.123 0.211 0.149 0.152
17-Textile Industry 0.173 0.172 0.307 0.296
18-Garments and Other Fibre Products 0.035 0.065 0.450 0.453
19-Leather, Furs, Down and Related Products 0.041 0.081 0.494 0.397
20-Timber Processing 0.028 0.068 0.462 0.230
21-Furniture Manufacturing 0.042 0.100 0.360 0.214
22-Papermaking and Paper Products 0.040 0.072 0.371 0.190
23-Printing and Record Medium Reproduction 0.018 0.059 0.375 0.350
24-Cultural, Educational and Sports Goods 0.094 0.092 0.335 0.389
25-Petroleum Refining and Coking 0.050 0.064 0.289 0.209
26-Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products 0.092 0.107 0.313 0.332
27-Medical and Pharmaceutical Products 0.204 0.252 0.358 0.372
28-Chemical Fibre 0.140 0.104 0.267 0.394
29-Rubber Products 0.102 0.098 0.320 0.305
30-Plastic Products 0.091 0.102 0.382 0.339
31-Nonmetal Mineral Products 0.037 0.107 0.381 0.230
32-Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals 0.058 0.069 0.296 0.248
33-Smelting and Pressing of Nonferrous Metals 0.060 0.097 0.329 0.335
34-Metal Products 0.061 0.079 0.334 0.311
35-Ordinary Machinery 0.142 0.132 0.295 0.320
36-Special Purposes Equipment 0.178 0.172 0.348 0.373
37-Transport Equipment 0.141 0.155 0.355 0.347
39-Other Electronic Equipment 0.148 0.140 0.361 0.418
40-Electric Equipment and Machinery 0.268 0.232 0.476 0.533
41-Electronic and Telecommunications 0.257 0.257 0.353 0.460
42-Instruments and meters 0.057 0.070 0.392 0.330
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Table 3: 
Innovation spillovers from FDI and access to finance: 
Results from alternative estimators 
    
  
 (1) (2) (3) 
COEFFICIENT PANEL TOBIT TOBIT IV Linear GMM 
    
R&D 2.312*** 4.323*** 2.118*** 
 (30.4) (19.0) (10.8) 
Labour training 0.481*** 0.862*** 0.700*** 
 (11.5) (7.22) (3.65) 
Export intensity 0.252*** 0.238*** 0.217*** 
 (39.3) (24.4) (18.5) 
Market share 0.576*** 0.600*** 0.901*** 
 (41.6) (29.7) (21.0) 
Finance 0.0413*** 0.0696*** 0.0684*** 
 (46.9) (35.6) (23.8) 
Subsidy 0.0271*** 0.0313*** 0.0399*** 
 (38.8) (24.7) (18.3) 
Age 0.0505*** 0.0487*** 0.00197*** 
 (27.4) (19.2) (6.69) 
Foreign capital 0.135*** 0.217*** 0.168*** 
 (6.85) (5.54) (3.65) 
FDI -0.643*** -0.797*** -0.500*** 
 (-45.8) (-35.3) (-23.5) 
FDI * R&D 1.428*** 1.881*** 1.241*** 
 (88.1) (54.2) (26.1) 
FDI * finance 0.153*** 0.0922** -0.00929 
 (8.22) (2.21) (-1.51) 
Private firms 0.0463*** 0.0634*** 0.0389*** 
 (9.39) (10.8) (12.4) 
Collective firms -0.110*** -0.0686*** -0.0800*** 
 (-21.9) (-11.5) (-7.15) 
Observations 630900 390352 390352 
p-value from 
Hansen’s test of 
overidentication  
  .179 
 
 
 
Notes: 
1. All specifications includes time, regional and industry fixed effects 
2. t statistics in parentheses         
3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
4. All regressors are lagged by one period in all regressions 
5. Because of the use of twice-lagged variables as instruments in the Tobit IV and linear GMM models, 
the number of observations in the estimations has declined sharply. 
6. State-owned firms form the base group in all regressions.     
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Table 4 
FDI spillovers and access to finance: 
Estimates from panel Tobit models with firm-specific heterogeneity 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
COEFFICIENT STATE PRIVATE COLLECTIVE LOSS  
MAKERS 
PROFIT 
MAKERS 
      
R&D 1.100*** 2.857*** 6.591*** 1.034*** 3.213*** 
 (12.3) (24.3) (19.5) (8.27) (32.8) 
Labour training 0.552*** 0.464*** 0.415*** 0.345*** 0.449*** 
 (6.40) (7.84) (4.56) (2.99) (9.90) 
Export intensity 0.363*** 0.232*** 0.274*** 0.267*** 0.252*** 
 (25.5) (26.2) (19.2) (15.6) (36.4) 
Market share 0.487*** 0.535*** 0.497*** 0.435*** 0.625*** 
 (29.7) (22.8) (11.5) (14.8) (39.7) 
Finance 0.0085*** 0.0384*** 0.0406*** 0.0372 0.0470*** 
 (31.7) (26.8) (18.9) (0.66) (46.7) 
Subsidy 0.0235*** 0.0335*** 0.0163*** 0.0243*** 0.0268*** 
 (24.3) (29.8) (9.69) (14.7) (34.9) 
Age 0.0478*** 0.0465*** 0.0806*** 0.0218*** 0.0409*** 
 (15.0) (17.9) (17.1) (5.93) (21.6) 
Foreign capital 0.333*** 0.0978*** 0.135*** 0.0816* 0.123*** 
 (7.73) (3.35) (3.45) (1.68) (5.68) 
FDI -0.502*** -0.631*** -0.838*** -0.358*** -0.684*** 
 (-19.4) (-32.0) (-25.1) (-10.9) (-43.9) 
FDI * R&D 1.106*** 1.474*** 1.560*** 1.178*** 1.478*** 
 (42.8) (62.6) (38.5) (30.7) (82.2) 
FDI * finance 0.0975 0.0575* 0.250*** 0.128 0.112*** 
 (1.42) (1.93) (5.50) (1.21) (5.29) 
Observations 125357 316461 189082 117001 513899 
          
 
Notes: 
1. All specifications includes time, regional and industry fixed effects 
2. t statistics in parentheses         
3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
4. All regressors are lagged by one period.   
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Table 5 
Access to finance by FDI firms and innovation spillovers to domestic firms  
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
COEFFICIENT STATE PRIVATE COLLECTIVE LOSS PROFIT 
      
R&D 0.823*** 2.914*** 5.197*** 1.134*** 2.591*** 
 (7.99) (36.1) (24.1) (13.2) (42.0) 
Labour training 0.250** 0.338*** 0.300*** 0.294*** 0.309*** 
 (2.32) (8.32) (5.20) (3.71) (10.6) 
Export intensity 0.247*** 0.105*** 0.133*** 0.144*** 0.119*** 
 (13.3) (17.8) (15.5) (13.0) (27.0) 
Market share 0.350*** 0.460*** 0.282*** 0.347*** 0.431*** 
 (16.0) (27.4) (10.4) (17.1) (40.1) 
Finance 0.0011*** 0.0289*** 0.0281*** 0.028 0.0311***
 (19.1) (27.8) (19.6) (1.21) (44.9) 
Subsidy 0.0172*** 0.0234*** 0.0117*** 0.0159*** 0.0181***
 (14.0) (29.6) (10.8) (14.0) (35.5) 
Age 0.0309*** 0.0404*** 0.0590*** 0.0383*** 0.0437***
 (7.51) (21.6) (19.2) (13.6) (30.8) 
Foreign capital 0.205*** 0.0542*** 0.0737*** 0.0698** 0.0757***
 (3.23) (2.64) (2.92) (2.09) (5.26) 
FDI innovation -0.0345** -0.110*** -0.0452*** -0.091* -0.034*** 
 (-2.35) (-9.01) (-2.72) (-1.82) (-10.4) 
FDI innovation * 
R&D 
0.384*** 0.518*** 0.314*** 0.409*** 0.443*** 
 (8.74) (24.3) (9.82) (11.7) (30.1) 
FDI innovation * 
finance 
-0.0191 0.0205** 0.0490** -0.0067 0.0677** 
 (-0.91) (2.22) (2.75) (-1.19) (2.46) 
FDI loan -0.190 -0.493*** -0.475*** -0.277*** -0.433*** 
 (-1.49) (-35.2) (-22.3) (-12.0) (-42.1) 
FDI loan * R&D 0.653*** 0.828*** 0.864*** 0.735*** 0.764*** 
 (11.2) (36.3) (24.5) (17.8) (47.5) 
FDI loan * finance 0.0026 0.0115** 0.0378** -0.00185 0.059** 
 (0.90) (2.03) (2.47) (-0.26) (2.57) 
Observations 125357 316461 189082 117001 513899 
         
       
Notes: 
1. All specifications includes time, regional and industry fixed effects 
2. t statistics in parentheses         
3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
4. All regressors are lagged by one period.   
 
 
